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ABSTRACT
Proposition 13, adopted by California voters in 1978, mandates a property tax rate of one percent,
requires that properties be assessed at market value at the time of sale, and allows assessments to rise
by no more than 2% per year until the next sale. In this paper, we examine how Prop 13 has affected
the average tenure length of owners and renters in California versus in other states. We find that from
1970 to 2000, the average tenure length of owners and renters in California increased by 1.04 years
and .79 years, respectively, relative to the comparison states. We also find substantial variation in
the response to Prop 13, with African-American households responding more than households of
other races and migrants responding more than native-born households. Among owner-occupiers,
the response to Prop 13 increases sharply as the size of the subsidy rises. Homeowners living in
inland California cities such as Bakersfield receive Prop 13 subsidies averaging only $110/year and
their average tenure length increased by only .11 years in 2000, but owners living in coastal
California cities receive Prop 13 subsidies averaging in the thousands of dollars and their average
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     In 2003, financier Warren Buffett announced that he pays property taxes of $14,410, 
or 2.9%, on his $500,000 home in Omaha, Nebraska, but pays only $2,264, or 0.056%, 
on his $4 million home in California.
2  Although Buffet is known as an astute investor, 
the low property taxes on his California home are not due to his investment prowess, but 
to Proposition 13.  Proposition 13, adopted by California voters in 1978, mandates a 
property tax rate of one percent plus the cost of interest on locally approved bonds.  It 
also requires that properties be assessed at their market value at the time of purchase and 
allows assessments to rise by no more than the inflation rate or 2% per year, whichever is 
lower.  Reassessment to full market value occurs only when the property is sold again.  
This means that as long as property values increase by more than 2% per year, 
homeowners gain from remaining in the same house because their taxes are lower than 
they would be on a different house of the same value.   Prop 13 thus gives rise to a lock-
in effect for owner-occupiers that increases stronger over time.  Prop 13 also affects the 
rental market, both directly because it applies to landlords and indirectly because it 
reduces the turnover of owner-occupied homes.         
       Although California was the only state for many years to adopt such a radical 
property tax reform, Prop 13-style tax reforms are becoming increasingly popular.
3  
                                                 
1 We are grateful for comments from participants in the Harvard Public Economics seminar and for 
research support from the National Science Foundation under grant number 0212444. 
2 See Joseph T. Hallinane, “Schwarzenegger Adviser Buffett Hints Property Tax is Too Low,”  Wall Street 
Journal, August 15, 2003, p. A1.  Note that Prop 13 benefits non-resident owners of California property 
such as Buffett, even though they avoid paying other California taxes.     
3 Several other states, including Massachusetts, Oregon, and Florida, adopted property tax limitations in the 
early 1980’s, but these provisions limited the growth of property tax revenues at the jurisdiction level, not 
at the individual property level.  The best known is Proposition 2 ½ in Massachusetts, adopted in 1980, 
which capped the property tax rate at 2 ½ percent and limited the increase in cities’ and towns’ property tax 
revenues to a maximum of 2 ½ percent per year.   On Prop 2 ½, see Cutler et al (1999) and Lang and Jian 
(2004).    2 
Florida adopted a similar property tax reform in the late 1990’s and Maine adopted the 
identical tax reform in November 2004.
4    
       In this paper, we test the lock-in effect of Prop 13 on California owners and renters.  
We find that, holding everything else constant, from 1970 to 2000 the average tenure 
length of owners and renters in California increased by 1.04 years and .79 years, 
respectively, relative to the increases in average tenure length of the same groups in other 
states.  These figures amount to increases of 9% and 18%, respectively, in the average 
tenure length of owners and renters.  We also find that the lock-in effect of Prop 13 varies 
substantially across demographic groups, with African-American households responding 
more than other racial groups and migrants to California responding more than native-
born Californians.  Among owner-occupiers, we also find that the response to Prop 13 
increases sharply as the subsidy rises:  as of 2000, owners with subsidies of $110 (typical 
of residents of Bakersfield) had increased tenure length of .11 years, but owners with 
subsidies of $1400 per year (typical of the Los Angeles basin area) had increased tenure 
length of more than 2 years, and residents of the Bay area had increased tenure length of 
three years or more.      
        The paper is arranged as follows.  Section I describes Prop 13 and other property tax 
limitations.  Section II discusses the prior literature and section III sketches a theory of 
how property tax limitations affect mobility.  Section IV describes the data and presents 
regression results.  Section V examines how the responsive to Prop 13 varies with the 
size of individual households’ subsidies.   Section VI concludes.   
 
I.  Property Tax Limitations 
     California.  Proposition 13 was adopted by voter referendum in California in 1978.    
It rolled property assessments back to the level that prevailed when the owner acquired 
the property or in 1975-76, whichever was later.  It also limited assessment increases to 
the inflation rate or two percent per year, whichever is lower, until the next time the 
                                                 
4 The Maine measure is identical to Prop 13 in its treatment of property taxes and it also applies to both 
residential and commercial property.   However, Maine’s proposition differs from Prop 13 in that it is not 
part of the Maine constitution.  Also while Prop 13 also required that future state taxes in California be 
passed by a two-thirds margin, Maine’s proposition contains no analogous provisions.  Information about 
the Maine property tax cap is at news.mainetoday.com/indepth/taxreform/040516taxnugget.shtml.  The 
Florida property tax limitation is discussed below.     3 
property is sold.  At that point, reassessment to current market value occurs.  Prop 13 also 
limited the property tax rate to one percent of assessed value plus the cost of pre-existing 
debt and it barred state or local governments from imposing any other taxes on property.  
These provisions applied to all types of property.  An additional amendment adopted in 
1978 allows homeowners to petition for their assessments to be reduced to market value 
if the Prop 13 assessment is greater than market value.  If market value later increases to 
more than the Prop 13 assessment, then the assessed value of the property shifts back to 
its Prop 13 assessment.  Finally, later amendments allowed homeowners to transfer 
ownership of the house within the family without losing their Prop 13 assessments and 
allowed homeowners who are at least 55 years of age to take their Prop 13 assessments 
with them when they move, as long as the new residence is of equal or lower value.
5   
     Since 1978, local governments have been given the power to establish various types of 
special districts that issue property tax-financed bonds or levy per parcel charges on 
properties within their boundaries.  These charges are in addition to the 1% property tax 
rate.  Some of the additional charges require voter approval by a two-thirds majority, 
while others require only a simple majority vote.  Some are levied on all properties, while 
others are levied only on new development.
6  
      To illustrate the long-term effect of Prop 13, suppose buyer A purchases a house for 
$100,000 in 1975 and buyers B, C and D purchase identical houses in 1985, 1995 and 
2005.  (We use 1975 because Prop 13 rolled assessments back to 1975.)  Assume that the 
property tax rate is 1%, property values increase at a constant rate of 10% per year and 
the rate of inflation is 2% per year.  By 1985, buyer A’s property taxes have risen from 
$1,000 to $1,195 per year.  But buyer B pays $235,800 for an identical house and 
receives a property tax bill of $2,358.  As of 1995, buyer A’s taxes have risen to $1,457, 
but buyer C pays $611,600 for the same house and has yearly taxes of $6,116.  Finally in 
2005—the 30
th anniversary of Prop 13—buyer A’s taxes have risen to $1,776, but buyer 
D pays $1,583,000 for an identical house and receives a property tax bill of $15,863.  
                                                 
5 The latter provision applies to moves within the same county and to inter-county moves within California, 
if the origin and destination counties have joined a reciprocal agreement.      
6 An example is the “parcel tax” of $293 per year per property levied by the Palo Alto Unified School 
District on all properties in its boundaries.  This tax, adopted in 2001, required a two-thirds majority vote.  
A proposal to raise the parcel tax was defeated in November 2004 (see 
www.pausd.org/community/downloads/supt/parceltax.pdf).        
   4 
Thus buyer A receives a property tax subsidy of .01*$235,800 - $1,195 = $1,163 per year 
in 1985, $4,659 in 1995, and $14,087 in 2005.  While these figures may seem high, they 
are much smaller than Warren Buffett’s property tax subsidy of $37,830.  Landlords 
receive the same benefit on their rental apartments.   
     From 1977 to 1987, the average property tax rate on single-family homes with FHA 
mortgages fell from .0221 to .0055 in California, or by 75%, compared to a decline from 
.0167 to .0115, or 31%, in the U.S. overall.
7     
 
       Texas and Florida.  Our comparison states are Texas and Florida, both large sunbelt 
states with high migration rates during the 1970 – 2000 period.
8  Texas and Florida have 
“traditional” property tax systems, meaning that properties are reassessed each year and 
assessments are set to equal market value.
9  Localities in each state determine the 
property tax rate and the rate is not subject to state-imposed limitations.  But in 1992, 
Florida adopted a Proposition 13-style tax reform, which went into effect in 1995.  The 
measure limited assessment increases for individual properties to the inflation rate or 3% 
per year, whichever is lower.  Like Prop 13, assessments revert to market value only 
when a new sale occurs.  Florida’s property tax reform also limited the property tax rate 
to 2 percent.  While Florida’s tax reform is similar to Proposition 13, it has been in effect 
for a shorter time period and it does not limit property taxes nearly as tightly as 
Proposition 13.     
         Texas has a rule that, when local jurisdictions conduct a general reassessment of all 
properties, the jurisdiction’s property tax revenues cannot increase by more than 8%.  
This limit differs from Prop 13 in that it applies to the combined value of all properties in 
the jurisdiction, not to individual properties.  Texas also limits the maximum property tax 
rate, but the limit is above 2% per year.  In the empirical work, we treat Texas as having 
no property tax limitations.   
                                                 
7 See O’Sullivan, Sexton, and Sheffrin (1993), table 2. 
8 Using Texas and Florida as comparison states allows us to control for the increase over time in 
households’ taste for living in warm climates.     
9 See O’Sullivan et al (1993), Table 3.     5 
        As of 1987, the average effective property tax rate was .009 in Florida and .014 in 
Texas, compared to .0055 in California.
 10    
       
II.  Prior Literature 
       Two previous studies have examined the effect of Proposition 13 on household 
mobility.  Nagy (1997) estimated the change in mobility between 1975 and 1981, using 
data from three metropolitan areas in California and seven metropolitan areas outside of 
California.  He found that mobility declined both in California and the comparison 
metropolitan areas and the difference between them was insignificant.  Nagy attributed 
the decline in mobility to the fact that mortgage interest rates rose over the period, so that 
all households that moved were forced to pay higher interest rates.  Our study has the 
advantage of using data for a longer period.    
     Stohs, Childs and Stevenson (2001) ran regressions explaining the percent of single-
family detached houses that were sold during the 1995-2000 period in census tracts in 
two California metropolitan areas and in parts of Chicago and Boston.  They found that 
the sale rate in California was lower, a difference that they attributed to Prop 13.  One 
problem with their analysis is that they do not attempt to control for the probability of 
sale before the adoption of Prop 13.  Thus if California had a lower sales rate than Illinois 
and Massachusetts as far back as the 1970’s, their method would attribute the low sales 
rate in California to Prop 13.
11    
      Another recent paper, by Ferreira (2004), examines the effect of the age 55 provision 
in California that allows households of this age to take their low assessments with them 
when they move.  He finds that the probability of California households moving increases 
when the household head turns 55.
12   
     O’Sullivan, Sexton, and Sheffrin (1993) and (1995) investigate the effect of Prop 13 
on property tax receipts, using simulation methods.    
   
                                                 
10 See O’Sullivan et al (1993), Table 2.  Also see ACIR (1995) for information on property tax limitations 
in all states.     
11 An additional complication is the adoption by Massachusetts of Proposition 2 ½ in 1980, which may 
have affected the probability of sale in Massachusetts during their period.       
12 See Wasi (2005) for an empirical study of moving behavior by California households that emphasizes the 
role of environmental amenities in location choice.     6 
III.  Theoretical Considerations 
O’Sullivan, Sexton, and Sheffrin (1995) provide a simple model of the effect of 
property tax limitations on mobility of owner-occupiers.  In their model, a representative 
household has a fixed lifespan of N years, during which it occupies n different housing 
units for i years each, so that n = N/i.  Households’ utility from living in any particular 
housing unit is assumed to decay over time at a constant rate d.  This may be because the 
quality of the housing unit gradually declines or because the quality of the fit between the 
household and the housing unit declines, or a combination of both.  Moving to a new 
housing unit is assumed to cost a fixed amount C.  For owner-occupiers, C includes the 
costs of selling one house and purchasing another (including real estate agents’ fees, the 
fixed cost of obtaining a new mortgage, and the cost of moving household goods), plus 
the costs of moving household goods.  For renters, C includes the costs of finding a new 
apartment and the cost of moving household goods.  Since the utility of remaining in the 
same housing unit declines over time while the cost of moving remains constant, 
households eventually prefer to move.  Households choose the number of housing units 
they occupy over their lifetimes so as to maximize lifetime utility. 
 O’Sullivan et al show that this model has a closed form solution under a set of 
assumptions concerning functional form and we examine a variant of their model.  
Assume that the household utility function takes the additive form U = H + X, where H is 
lifetime housing consumption and X is lifetime consumption of other goods.  Housing 
services per dwelling are denoted h.  Because of decay, the housing services provided by 




) 1 ( .  Lifetime housing 
services consumed by a household equal h times the number of houses occupied, or 
i hN H / = .  The price per unit of housing services provided by a dwelling is p.  If the 
discount rate is zero, then households’ lifetime budget constraint is:   
i CN i phN X YN / / + + =  
where the three terms on the right hand side represent lifetime expenditure on other 
goods, lifetime expenditure on housing, and lifetime moving costs.  Households 
maximize utility over the choice of tenure length, or the number of years spent in each 








Here, tenure length increases as the cost of moving C rises and falls as the decay rate d 
rises.  Also as the price of housing p increases, households’ tenure length increases.  This 
is because a higher price of housing reduces net income, so that the marginal utility of 
consuming other goods rises.    
 
  The effect of Prop 13 on owner-occupiers.  Now consider how property tax 
limitations such as Prop 13 affect owner-occupiers’ choice of tenure length.  While the 
simple model just discussed has no explicit property taxes, Prop 13 can be thought of as 
an increase in the cost of moving, C.  This is because when households reduce their 
tenure length from  iyears to  1 - i  years, they lose the Prop 13 subsidy for the i
th year for 
each house they occupy.  Because the i
th year subsidy is the highest, losing it raises the 
cost of moving.  The larger the Prop 13 subsidy, the stronger is the household’s incentive 
to increase its tenure length.
13   
   
The effect of Prop 13 on renters.  Now consider whether and how Proposition 13 
affects renters’ tenure length.  Because Prop 13 treats all properties identically, individual 
landlords receive the same Prop 13 subsidies as homeowners, i.e., the Prop 13 subsidies 
depend on how long landlords have owned their rental housing units.  However landlords 
are not under any legal obligation to pass their Prop 13 subsidies on to tenants, so that 
whether they do depends on conditions in the rental housing market.  Landlords are likely 
to pass on their Prop 13 subsidies to tenants if there is excess supply in the rental housing 
market--the same conditions under which rents are likely to be low or falling.  Similarly, 
landlords are unlikely to pass on their Prop 13 subsidies to tenants when there is excess 
demand for rental housing—the same conditions under which rents are likely to be high 
                                                 
13 One feature of Prop 13 that the O’Sullivan et al model does not capture is the fact that it incorporates a 
put option.  When the market value of housing declines or increases very slowly, the Prop 13 subsidy can 
become negative, since Prop 13 assessments never fall and may rise by up to 2 percent per year.  However 
when this happens, owners can either petition to have their assessments lowered to market value or can 
move to a different house, where the new assessment will be equal to market value.  These features imply 
that owners gain from increases in market value because their Prop 13 subsidies increase, but do not bear 
the full cost of losses in market value because their Prop 13 subsidies cannot be negative.     8 
or rising.  These factors suggest that whether individual tenants benefit from Prop 13 
depends on conditions in the local rental housing market and on how long their landlords 
have owned the properties, rather than on individual tenants’ tenure length.  They also 
suggest that in the regressions explaining renters’ tenure, controls are needed for local 
housing market conditions.   
However Prop 13 is also likely to affect renters’ tenure indirectly via its effect on 
households’ propensity to shift from rental to owner-occupied housing.  Suppose a 
typical household rents until (say) age 30 and then shifts to owning.  Because of the Prop 
13 lock-in effect, existing owner-occupiers move less often and therefore the supply of 
owner-occupied housing units offered for sale falls.  While the Prop 13 lock-in effect also 
causes demand by households who are already owners to fall, demand by renter 
households who wish to become owners remains the same.  Unless the supply of newly-
built houses increases enough to fully offset the supply reduction, the price of owner-
occupied houses will rise.  This forces renter households to delay their transition to 
owning and therefore raises the demand for rental housing.  Because households remain 
renters for longer, their average tenure length as renters increases.
14       
Thus Prop 13 is predicted to cause renters’ tenure length to rise, because households 
spend more time as renters before becoming owners.       
 
The effect of Prop 13 on incentives to migrate to California from other states.  
Finally, consider how Prop 13 affects households’ decisions to move to California from 
other states.  Suppose potential migrants to California are divided into two groups, 
frequent movers versus infrequent movers (corresponding to high versus low values of 
the decay parameter d).  Infrequent movers have an incentive to move to California from 
other states, since they anticipate that they will benefit in the future from Prop 13; while 
frequent movers have an incentive to avoid California, since they will be harmed by Prop 
                                                 
14 This story would suggest that, since the adoption of Prop 13, the homeowning rate should have risen 
more slowly or fallen faster in California than in Texas/Florida.  In fact from 1970 to 2000, the average 
homeowning rate declined in the metropolitan areas that benefited the most from Prop 13 (see below for 
discussion of which metropolitan areas benefited more versus less from Prop 13).  Specifically the rate 
declined by 2.8 percentage points in San Francisco, 2 percentage points in San Jose, and 0.6 percentage 
points in Los Angeles.  In comparison it increased over the same period by 1.1 percentage point in Florida, 
but declined by 1.0 percentage point in Texas.  The overall change in the average homeowning rate over 
the period in California was an increase of 1.3 percentage points.       9 
13.  This suggests that migrants to California from other states will tend to be selected 
from the group of infrequent movers, since the latter are willing to pay the most for 
California housing.  As a result, migrant households are predicted to respond more 
strongly to Prop 13 than native-born California households.
15   
 
Summing up, this section suggests several testable hypotheses:  (1) California owner-
occupiers are predicted to increase their tenure length after the adoption of Prop 13 by 
more than owner-occupiers in other states over the same time period; (2) California 
renters are predicted to increase their tenure length after the adoption of Prop 13 by more 
than renters in other states over the same time period; (3) households who migrate to 
California are predicted to respond more strongly to Prop 13 than native-born California 
households; and (4) the lock-in effect of Prop 13 will depend on the size of the subsidy, 
so that it will be higher in areas where housing values are higher and/or increase more 
quickly.       
 
IV.  Data and summary statistics 
      Our data are taken from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS, 
available at www.ipums.org), which combines a 1% random sample of households from 
the 1970 Census of Population and 5% random samples of households from the 1980, 
1990 and 2000 Censuses of Population.  We include all households living in metropolitan 
areas in California and, as a control group, all households living in metropolitan areas in 
Florida and Texas.  Florida and Texas are used as control states because, like California, 
they are large sunbelt states that experienced substantial immigration during our sample 
period.  Our sample includes all metropolitan areas that met the Census definition of a 
metropolitan area as of 1970.  Households with heads less than 25 years of age are 
                                                 
 
15 An offsetting factor is that frequent movers among native-born Californians have an incentive to leave 
the state, while infrequent movers among native-born Californians have an incentive to stay.   But moving 
costs are likely to make the selection effect for migrants stronger than that for natives.  This is because 
migrants to California are only observed if they actually migrated from another state, meaning that their 
gains from moving exceed their moving costs.  However native-born Californians are observed as long as 
they did not leave for another state, meaning that their gains from moving were less than their moving 
costs.        10 
dropped.   Unweighted sample sizes are approximately 48,000 in 1970 and between 
350,000 and 450,000 in each of the later years. 
       Households’ tenure length in their current housing units is coded in intervals of up to 
1 year, 2-5 years, 6-10 years, 11-20 years, 21-30 years, and more than 30 years.  We set 
individual households’ tenure length at the midpoint of the relevant range, or 40 years for 
those whose tenure length is more than 30 years.
16   
 
V.  DD and DDD models of the lock-in effect  
       We estimate a treatment effects model.  Our basic specification is:   
ist hmt st t m hmt e dX T bB aA Y + + + + = b                             (1) 
Here, the household index is h, the time index is t, and the location index is either state s 
or metropolitan area m.   hmt Y  is the number of years that household h in metropolitan area 
m in year t has lived in its current residence,  m A  is a set of dummy variables for 
metropolitan areas (Austin, Texas is omitted) and t B  is a set of year dummy variables 
(1970 is omitted).   We include metropolitan area dummies rather than state dummies to 
take account of differences across metropolitan areas in average tenure length that existed 
prior to the adoption of Prop 13.
17   The treatment effect  st T  consists of three separate 
state-year interactions for California households in each of the years when Prop 13 was in 
effect, i.e., 1980, 1990 and 2000.  The three  b  coefficients measure the difference-in-
difference (DD), or the change in average years of tenure from 1970 to 1980 or later 
years for California households minus the change in average years of tenure for 
Texas/Florida households over the same period.  Because Prop 13 is predicted to have an 
                                                 
16 For 1970, the categories are less than one year, 2 years, 3 years, 4-6 years, 7-10 years, 11-20 years, more 
than 20 years, and “always lived here.”  We code more than 20 years as 35.5 years and “always lived here” 
as age of the household head minus 14.      
17 Average tenure length by metropolitan area in 1970 ranges from 7.2 years in Fort Lauderdale-
Hollywood-Pompano Beach FL to 13.4 years in Beaumont-Port Arthur-Orange TX.  In California in 1970, 
the range is from 7.6 years in Ventura to 12.5 years in Stockton.       11 
increasing effect over time, we expect that the coefficients of the  st T  variables will 
increase as more years have elapsed since 1970.   Finally hmt X  is a vector of control 
variables that include individual household characteristics, individual house 
characteristics, and metropolitan area characteristics for each of the relevant years.   We 
estimate (1) both with and without the control variables.  Also since Prop 13 affects 
owners and renters differently, we estimate (1) separately for each group.   
        We also break the treatment effects down by race or migration status.  To do so, we 
estimate a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) model of the following form:    
ist hmt rst rt sr st r t m hmt e dX T I I I cC bB aA Y + + ¢ ¢ ¢ + ¢ ¢ + ¢ + + + + = b b b b               (2) 
Here  r C  is a set of dummy variables for race (white is omitted),  st I ,  sr I  and  rt I are state-
time, state-race and race-year interactions, respectively, and  rst T  is a set of interactions of  
California, years after 1970, and races other than white.  The coefficient  b ¢ ¢ ¢  measures 
the DDD for a particular racial group relative to whites, or the DD for the particular racial 
group minus the DD for whites over the same period.
18   The specification is the same 
when migration status is substituted for race.  Again we estimate (2) both with and 
without the vector of control variables and we estimate it separately for owners versus 
renters.
19 
       A.  Results without control variables 
       Table 1A gives average tenure length by year, separately for owner-occupiers versus 
renters and for residents of California versus Texas and Florida.  Average tenure length 
for owner-occupiers in California in 1970 was 10.76 years, compared to 10.65 years for 
Texas/Florida residents in the same year.  By 2000, these figures had risen to 13.43 years 
in California versus 11.65 years in Texas and Florida.  Table 1A also gives the 
difference-in-difference for California versus the other states.  From 1970 to 2000, it was 
                                                 
18 See Gruber (1994) for discussion of DDDs.  Note that some households are counted as both African-
American and Hispanic.  We follow Betts (2000) in our coding of the race variables, as well as the 
education variables.    
19 We were unable both to use interval regression and to cluster the error terms.  If we use interval 
regression but do not cluster the error terms, the coefficients remain virtually the same.      12 
1.66 years, or 16% of the average tenure length in 1970.  Because of the large sample 
sizes, all of these figures are highly statistically significant.
20   
        Turning to renters, average tenure length in 1970 was 4.30 years in California versus 
4.09 years in Texas and Florida, but by 2000 it had increased to 5.25 years in California, 
while remaining constant at 4.07 years in Texas and Florida.  The difference-in-
difference from 1970 to 2000 was .97 years, or 23% of the average tenure length in 1970.  
The large DD figure for renters in California is surprising, since Prop 13 has a more 
indirect effect on renters than on owners.  All of the figures in table 1A are strongly 
statistically significant.   
       Table 1B breaks these figures down by race, where the categories are whites, 
African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asians.
21  The table gives the difference-in-
differences for white households in California versus Texas/Florida between 1970 and 
later years and it also gives DDD figures for other races relative to whites.   For white 
homeowners, the DD from 1970 to 2000 is 2.12 years.  A surprising result is that 
African-American homeowners responded more strongly to Prop 13 than white 
homeowners—the DDD for African-American owners relative to white owners is 1.40 
years from 1970 to 2000.  This means that African-American owners’ tenure length in 
California relative to Texas/Florida increased over the period by 1.40 years more than the 
same increase for white owners.  The same pattern holds for renters:  the DD for whites is 
0.71 years from 1970 to 2000, while the DDD for African-American relative to white 
renters is 1.96 years from 1970 to 2000.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis 
that African-Americans faced a more restricted menu of housing choices than whites 
because of discrimination, and therefore responded more strongly when their incentive to 
stay put increased under Prop 13.               
                                                 
20 Each of the figures in table 1A is computed from a separate regression.  The average tenure length for 
California homeowners in 1970 is computed by regressing tenure length of California homeowners in 1970 
on a constant term.  The DD figure for owners from 1970 to 1980 is computed by estimating (1) without 
the control variables, using owners in all three states in 1970 and 1980 as the sample.   The DD figure is the 
coefficient of California*1980.  The same procedures are followed in the rest of table 1A and in tables 1B 
and 1C.   Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.       
21 Households are coded as Hispanic if they identify themselves as white with Hispanic origin (Mexican, 
Mexican-American, Puerto Rican Cuban, Central American, South Dominican or other Hispanic).  A fourth 
category, “other races,” is not reported.  It includes Eskimos, Aleuts, Pacific Islanders and American 
Indians.     13 
     Table 1C breaks the figures down by migration status, where the categories are (1) 
households living in the head’s state of birth (“native-born”), (2) migrants that moved to 
the state from a different U.S. state (“out-of-state migrants”), and (3) immigrants that 
moved to the state from another country.  As discussed above, the theory predicts that 
migrants will respond to Prop.13 more strongly than native-born households.          
      For native-born owner-occupiers, the difference-in-difference between tenure length 
in California versus Texas and Florida from 1970 to 2000 is only .16 years.  But the DDD 
for migrants versus native-born homeowners over the same period is a strikingly large 
3.37 years.
22  For native-born renters, the DD from 1970 to 2000 is .61 years—larger than 
the figure for homeowners, while the DDD for migrants versus native-born renters over 
the same period is .77 years.   Thus, as the theory predicts, migrants to California from 
other states respond more strongly to Proposition 13 than native-born households, 
regardless of whether they were owners and renters.  However immigrants responded less 
strongly to Prop 13 than native-born households—the DDD figures relative to native-
born households from 1970 to 1990 and 2000 are mainly negative.   This may be because 
there was a large increase in immigration to all three states over the period, so that many 
immigrant households had low tenure because they had been in the U.S. for only a few 
years.   In the regressions below, we control for immigrant/migrant status.            
      These results suggest that Proposition 13 had several important effects.  First, 
migrants to California from other states responded more strongly to Prop 13 than native-
born California households, suggesting that California migrants were selected from the 
group of infrequent movers.  Second, African-American households responded more 
strongly to Prop 13 than white or Hispanic households.  Third, the response of renters to 
Prop 13 is surprisingly large—in some cases even larger in absolute terms than that of 
owners.  This suggests that Prop 13 also had strong effects on tenants, both because 
landlords passed on part of their Prop 13 benefit to tenants on the form of lower rents and 
                                                 
22 In 1970, native-born homeowners California had longer average tenure length than migrants from other 
states:  10.92 years versus 10.48 years, respectively.  By 2000, the figures were reversed, with an average 
tenure of 15.53 years for migrants versus 13.01 for native-born households.  The pattern is similar for 
renters in California; the average tenure length in 1970 was 4.52 years for native-born households versus 
4.15 for migrants, while the 2000 figures are 5.84 for migrants versus 5.01 for native-born households.        14 
because tenants found it more difficult to become homeowners after the adoption of Prop 
13.         
B.  Results with control variables 
         In this section, we re-estimate eqs. (1) and (2) with the vector of control variables 
hmt X .   The household-level control variables are total income, income from welfare, the 
number of children in the household, and a dummy variable for the presence of children 
aged 6 or below.  We also include a set of dummy variables representing the age of the 
household head (26-35 years of age is omitted), the head’s marital status (single is 
omitted), the education level of the household head (high school dropout is omitted), the 
head’s race (white is omitted), and the head’s migration status (native-born is omitted).   
The detailed marital status variables are entered since being married, divorced or 
widowed often leads to a move and the detailed work status variables are entered since 
changing jobs or joining the armed forces or retiring may lead to a move.  We also 
include several dummy variables for employment status:  at work (which means being 
employed but not working at the time of the Census), self-employed, not self-employed, 
in the armed forces, and unemployed (not in the labor force is omitted).  We also include 
several interactions of these categories, as well as a separate proxy for retirement, which 
equals one if the head is at least 65 and out of the labor force.  A dummy variable for 
living in a large metropolitan areas is also included (small metropolitan areas are the 
omitted category).  The individual-level housing variables are dummy variables for 
housing type (multi-family housing is omitted).  The metropolitan area-level variables are 
the unemployment rate, the change in housing values over the previous ten years, and the 
increase in the population over the previous ten years.   
       Table 2 gives summary statistics for the control variables, broken down by year, by 
California versus Texas/Florida and by homeowner versus renter.  For Texas/Florida to 
be good controls for California, the two states must have similar characteristics in 1970.  
In fact the 1970 figures are very similar for California versus Texas/Florida.  The 
strongest exception is that California had more migrants from other states than 
Texas/Florida, 63% versus 51% for owners, respectively, and 65% versus 51% for 
renters, respectively.  Also California had fewer African-American households than   15 
Texas/Florida:  5% versus 10% for owners, respectively, and 10% versus 19% for renters, 
respectively.   Over the period when Prop 13 was in effect, the percent of owners who 
were migrants from other states fell more sharply in California than in Texas/Florida; the 
decrease was from 63% in 1970 to 39% in 2000 in California, while the figure remained 
nearly constant at about 50% in Texas/Florida.  For renters, the percent who were 
migrants from other states declined from 65% to 31% over the period 1970 to 2000 in 
California, compared to a smaller drop in Texas/Florida from 51% to 38% over the same 
period.  In addition, California had more Asian immigration at an earlier date than 
Texas/Florida.  In other respects, demographic changes were similar in California and the 
comparison states.  
     Table 3 gives the results of estimating eq. (1) with the vector of controls.
23  The results 
for owners are on the left and those for renters on the right.  (Results for the metropolitan 
area dummies are not reported.)  Robust standard errors clustered by state-year are shown 
in parentheses.  The qualitative results are remarkably similar for owner-occupiers versus 
renters, although the coefficients tend to be smaller in absolute value for renters—not 
surprising since renters’ average tenure length is much shorter.   In both regressions, 
tenure length rises steeply with the age of the household head—households with heads 
greater than 65 have 13.2 additional years of tenure if they are owners and 5.7 additional 
years if they are renters, compared to heads aged 26-35.  Tenure length falls with income 
and education and is lower for married, separated and divorced household heads than for 
single household heads.  Households with young children have lower tenure length, 
presumably because they often move to accommodate the children’s needs, but additional 
children in the household are associated with slightly greater tenure length.  Living in a 
single-family detached house is associated with 4.7 and 1.3 additional years of tenure for 
owners and renters, respectively, compared to living in multi-family housing.  Average 
tenure length for African-American and Hispanic households is longer than that for 
whites, regardless of whether they own or rent.   Migrants from other states and 
                                                 
23 In these regressions, households whose total income was top-coded are treated as having the highest 
income level, which was $75,000 in 1980, $400,000 in 1990, and $999,997 in 2000.   To check for whether 
the results are sensitive to how the highest income levels are coded, we reran the regressions with 
additional dummy variables for households with top-coded income in each year and we also reran the 
regressions without the top-coded households.  The results for the treatment variables were essentially 
unchanged.      16 
immigrants both have shorter tenure than native-born households, regardless of whether 
they are owners or renters.  Compared to households with heads who are out of the labor 
force, those who are employed or self-employed have shorter tenure length, while those 
who are retired have longer tenure length.  The dummy variables for 1980, 1990 and 
2000 indicate that tenure length increased over time.  All of these variables are strongly 
statistically significant.   
      The difference-in-difference results are reported at the bottom of table 3 and collected 
in table 4A.  For owners, the figures are -.14 years in 1980, .32 years in 1990 and 1.04 
years in 2000.  Only the figure for 2000 is statistically significant, but the results suggest 
that the effect of Prop 13 is increasing over time.  For renters, the figures are 0 in 1980, 
.39 years in 1990 and .79 years in 2000, with only the 2000 figures being statistically 
significant.  Both sets of figures are about 2/3rds the size of the raw difference-in-
difference results shown in table 1A.     
      Table 4B gives the results of estimate eq. (2) with control variables, where we break 
the treatment variables down by race.  Only the results for the treatment effects are 
shown, since the results for the control variables are very similar to those given in table 3.  
For whites, only the diff-in-diff from 1970 to 2000 for owners is statistically significant;  
it is 1.16 years compared to 2.12 years in table 1B.   For African-American owners, only 
the DDD from 1970 to 1990 is statistically significant—it is 1.33 years.  For African-
American renters, the DDD from 1970 to 1990 is 1.8 years and the DDD from 1970 to 
2000 is 1.7 years and both are statistically significant.  Thus African-American 
households still respond much more strongly than whites to Prop 13 when we take 
account of demographic and market level factors.  The DDDs for Asian owners from 
1970 to 1990 and 2000 are 1.5 years and 1.86 years, respectively, and both figures are 
statistically significant.  However the DDDs for Asian renters are large and negative, 
which is similar to the results in table 1B.       
       Finally, table 4C gives the results of breaking down the treatment effects by migrant 
status.  Again the results show that migrants responded much more strongly to Prop 13 
than native-born households.  For owners, none of the difference-in-difference results for   17 
native-born households are statistically significant, but the DDD results for migrants 
relative to native-born are large and statistically significant in both 1990 and 2000.  The 
DDDs are 1.56 years from 1970 to 1990 and 1.51 years from 1970 to 2000.  For renters, 
the diff-in-diff for native-born households from 1970 to 2000 is .49 years and is 
statistically significant, while the DDD figures for out-of-state migrants relative to 
natives are .44 years, .40 years, and .57 years from 1970 to 1980, 1990 and 2000 and all 
are statistically significant.  Thus when we control for individual and metropolitan area 
characteristics, the result that migrants respond more strongly than native-born 
households continues to hold.   
VI.  Effects of higher Prop 13 subsidies  
In this section we compute an individual-household specific measure of the Prop 13 
subsidy and use it to examine how tenure length responds to increases in the subsidy 
level.  The Census asks owner-occupiers both the market value of their homes and their 
property taxes.  This allows us to compute a household-specific measure of the Prop 13 
subsidy for homeowners in California, which equals (market value)*(property tax rate) – 
(actual property taxes).  In the calculations, we use a property tax rate of 1.25 percent.
24   
Note that this calculation of the Prop 13 subsidy ignores the fact that Proposition 13 also 
mandated a permanent reduction in the California property tax rate. 
Table 5, top panel, shows how the average Proposition 13 subsidy varies by year and 
by metropolitan area, for all metropolitan areas in California.
   All figures are in 2000 
dollars.  Average subsidy levels rose for all metropolitan areas from 1980 to 1990, but 
fell in many metropolitan areas from 1990 to 2000.  This generally reflects the pattern of 
housing price changes during the 1990’s, when Southern California experienced a 
prolonged recession but Northern California did not.   For comparison purposes, we also 
compute hypothetical “Prop 13 subsidies” for each Texas and Florida metropolitan area 
                                                 
24 In 1980, the Census asked only for the combined amount paid for property taxes and insurance; while in 
1990 and 2000, it asked separate questions concerning the amounts paid for property taxes and insurance.  
To separate property taxes versus insurance in 1980, we estimated a model of insurance costs, using all 
California owner-occupiers in 1990 and 2000 (see table A1).  We used this model to predict insurance costs 
for California homeowners in 1980.  The predicted property taxes for homeowners in 1980 is the combined 
expenditure on property taxes and insurance in 1980 minus the predicted cost of insurance.      18 
in 1990 and 2000, using exactly the same procedure.  These figures are shown in the 
lower half of table 5.  Not surprisingly, they are smaller than the figures for California 
and are often negative—reflecting the fact that property values are lower in Texas and 
Florida and assessed values change frequently in response to changes in market value.  
The “subsidy” figures fell rather than rose in all but one of metropolitan area in Texas 
and Florida between 1990 and 2000.
25      
         In order to examine the subsidy distribution, we code dummy variables for each 
quartile of the distribution, using separate distributions for California homeowners in 
1980, 1990 and 2000.  Table 6A, columns (1) – (3), shows the average value of the 
subsidy for each quartile.  The distribution is quite unequal.  In 1990, the average 
household in the lowest quartile received a subsidy equal to about one-tenth of the 
average subsidy in the highest quartile--$428 versus $4,188.  In 2000, the distribution 
was even wider, mainly because the average in the lowest quartile fell to $102.  In 
column (4) of table 6A, we show subsidy values for Florida homeowners in 2000, where 
the calculations use the statutory Florida property tax rate of 2%.  The average subsidy 
varies from $193 in the lowest quartile to $2707 in the highest.     
        Table 6B gives mean tenure length by quartile for homeowners in California in 1980 
through 2000 and in Florida in 2000.  The striking result here is how strongly tenure 
length increased in the highest quartiles of the subsidy distribution.  From 1980 to 2000, 
mean tenure length of California households in the highest quartile increased sharply 
from 10.3 to 16.8 years and mean tenure length in the next-to-highest quartile increased 
from 9.2 to 15.4 years.  In contrast, mean tenure length in the lowest subsidy quartile fell 
from 13 to 9.6 years.  These results suggest that the mobility response to Prop 13 varies 
strongly depending on the size of the individual household’s subsidy and is very large for 
households in the top half of the subsidy distribution.   
       These figures may be influenced by other factors that affect mobility and/or by 
endogeneity, since longer tenure itself leads to higher subsidies whenever property values 
                                                 
25 The “subsidy” values in Texas in 2000 are affected by the “Robin Hood” school finance plan, which 
transfers property taxes from richer to poorer school districts.  Hoxby and Kuziemko (2004) show that the 
plan caused property values in richer/more urban Texas school districts to fall during the late 1990’s.          19 
increase by more than 2% per year.  We therefore run a regression model explaining 
tenure as a function of the household-specific Prop 13 subsidy and other control 
variables, using instruments for the subsidy variable.  Because the Prop 13 subsidy is 
positive only for California households in 1980-2000, we use a cross-section rather than a 
difference-in-difference specification.   
         The sample is homeowners in all three states in 1970, 1990 and 2000.  We drop 
observations in 1980 because we cannot compute the Prop 13 subsidy as accurately in 
1980 as in 1990 and 2000 (see the discussion above).  Our regression model explains 
years of tenure as a function of the property tax subsidy (in dollars), the property tax 
subsidy squared, year dummies, metropolitan area dummies, and the same control 
variables as in table 3.  We include both the subsidy and the subsidy squared, because 
responsiveness to the subsidy appears to increase as the subsidy gets larger.  The 
coefficients of the subsidy and subsidy squared variables capture the change in tenure 
length in 1990/2000 per dollar increase in the 1990/2000 subsidy.   
        As an instrument for the subsidy, we use the predicted subsidy level if all 
households had tenure length of 10 years.  To compute the predicted subsidy, we first 
regress the actual subsidy on tenure and the same control variables as in table 3, using 
separate regressions for California homeowners in 1990 and 2000.  Then we predict the 
subsidy for each household assuming that it has tenure length of 10 years.  We use 10 
years because it is the average tenure length of homeowners in the three states in 1970.  
We also use the predicted subsidy squared as an additional instrument.         
         The OLS and IV regression results for the subsidy and subsidy squared variables 
are given in table 7A, with robust standard errors clustered by year-state given in 
parentheses.  Column (1) shows that both the subsidy and subsidy squared variables are 
highly significant in the OLS regression.  In the IV specification, the coefficients are 
slightly smaller and only the subsidy variable is statistically significant.  Columns (3) and 
(4) repeat the regressions shown in columns (1) and (2), but drop observations in Florida 
in 2000, because these households also received property tax subsidies.  The results are 
very similar to those in columns (1) and (2).       20 
     Table 7B gives the predicted effects of higher subsidies on tenure length, using the 
results in table 7A.  We evaluate the effect on tenure length at the average subsidy levels 
prevailing in four different California metropolitan areas that represent the range of Prop 
13 subsidy levels.  Using the IV results in column (2), Prop 13 has little effect on average 
tenure length in Bakersfield, where the average subsidy is only $110, but it raises average 
tenure length by .77 years in Fresno, where the average subsidy is $450.  However the 
effects of Prop 13 are much greater in coastal California cities.  Tenure length increases 
by 2.3 years in Los Angeles/Orange County, where the average subsidy is $1400, and by 
3.0 years in San Francisco/San Jose, where the average subsidy is $3500.  The predicted 
effects are even larger if we drop Florida households in 2000 from the sample—5 years 
in San Francisco/San Jose.  These results suggest that Prop 13 caused an enormous drop 
in mobility of owner-occupiers in the coastal areas of California.    
     These results suggest that an unintended result of Prop 13 is to transfer public funds 
from inland to coastal California residents.  This is because, following the adoption of 
Prop 13, the state of California took over responsibility for funding public education.  
The combination of higher property values and uniform school spending would normally 
lead to a transfer of tax revenue from coastal to inland California, since property values 
are higher on the coast.   But because Prop 13 holds down property tax collections, it 
reduces the transfer.      
VII.  Conclusion 
          In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Proposition 13, in part on the grounds that 
it furthered the policy goals of increasing “local neighborhood preservation, continuity, 
and stability.”
26  Our results suggest that Prop 13 definitely furthered continuity and 
stability, since it caused a substantial increase in the average tenure length of California 
households relative to that of households in other states.  From 1970 to 2000, the average 
tenure length of California homeowners and renters increased by 1.04 and .79 years 
relative to that of homeowners and renters in the control states.  These figures represent 
                                                 
26 Nordlinger v. Hahn (US Law Week, 60 LW 4563-4574) (1992).    
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increases in average tenure of 10% and 19%, respectively.  The large effect of Prop 13 on 
renters’ tenure length is particularly striking and suggests that longer tenure by owner-
occupiers forces younger households to delay their transition from renting to owning.  
We also find that African-American households responded more strongly to Prop 13 than 
white households and out-of-state migrant households responded more strongly than 
native-born households.  From 1970 to 1990, the tenure length of African-American 
homeowners and renters increased by 1.3 years and 1.8 years, respectively, relative to 
that of white homeowners and renters; while from 1970 to 2000, the tenure length of 
migrant homeowners and renters increased by 1.5 years and .6 years, respectively, 
relative to that of native-born homeowners and renters.  Finally, the effect of Prop 13 on 
mobility varies widely depending on the size of the subsidy, with the largest effects 
occurring in coastal California cities where the increase in property values has been 
greatest.  From 1970 to 2000, average tenure length increased by less than one year in 
inland California cities, but by more than two years in the Los Angeles area and by three 
years in the Bay area.    
      Whether the Prop 13-induced increases in continuity and stability have been worth 
the cost in lost tax revenue and the resulting redistribution from inland to coastal 
California communities remain subjects for further research.     22 
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Table 1A:  Average Tenure Length for Metropolitan Area 
Residents (Years) 
 
  1970   1980   1990   2000  
Owners:         
  CA  10.76        
(.005) 
11.13        
(.005) 
12.64        
(.005) 
13.43        
(.005) 
  FL/TX  10.65        
(.007) 
10.35        
(.005) 
11.89        
(.005) 




  .67 (.011)  .64            
(.011) 
1.66          
(.011) 
         
Renters:         
  CA  4.30          
(.004) 
4.49          
(.004) 
4.67          
(.003) 
5.25          
(.003) 
  FL/TX  4.09          
(.006) 
3.96          
(.005) 
3.54          
(.003) 
4.07          
(.004) 
Diff-in-diff (DD)  
since 1970 
  .31            
(.009) 
.92            
(.009) 
.97            
(.009) 
Notes:  Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.  The sample consists of 
households living in metropolitan areas in California, Texas and Florida in 1970, 1980, 
1990 and 2000.  All calculations use weights.     25 
Table 1B:  Differences in Tenure Length by Race Relative to 
Whites (Years) 
 
Notes:  DD indicates the difference-in-difference, or the change in average tenure length 
of white California households minus the change in average tenure length of white  
Texas/Florida households over the same time period.  DDD indicates the DD for other 
household groups minus the DD for white households.  The sample consists of 
households living in metropolitan areas in California, Texas and Florida in 1970, 1980, 
1990 and 2000.  Figures are calculated using weights.      
  DD  DDD   DD  DDD   DD  DDD  
  1970 to 1980  1970 to 1990  1970 to 2000 
Owners:             
White  .85 
(.01) 
  .88  
(.01) 





  0.44 
(.04) 
  1.80 
(.05) 
  1.40 
(.05) 
Asian    3.11 
(.20) 
  2.38 
(.20) 
  2.42 
(.20) 
Hispanic    -0.58 
(.04) 
  -.15 
(.04) 
  -1.10 
(.04) 
             
Renters:             
White  0.21 
(.01) 
  0.63 
(.01) 





  .84 
(.03) 
  1.94 
(.03) 
  1.96 
(.03) 
Asian    -1.93 
(.12) 
  -2.54 
(.12) 
  -2.38 
(.12) 
Hispanic    -.004 
(.03) 
  .29 
(.02) 
  .15 
(.02)   26 
Table 1C:  Differences in Tenure Length by Migrant Status 
Relative to Native-born Households (Years) 
  DD  DDD   DD  DDD   DD  DDD  
  1970 to 1980  1970 to 1990  1970 to 2000 
Owners:     
       
Native-
born 
-.71    
(.02)    -1.40   
(.02) 






  2.35   
(.03)    3.68    
(.03) 
  3.37     
(.03) 
Immigrants    .47     
(.04)    .55     
(.04) 
  -.26     
(.04) 
             
Renters:             
Native-
born 
-.16     
(.02) 
  .58     
(.02) 






  .71     
(.02) 
  .63     
(.02) 
  .77     
(.02) 
Immigrants    .05     
(.03)    -.25     
(.03) 
  -.08     
(.03) 
Notes:  DD indicates the difference-in-difference, or the change in average tenure length 
of native California households minus the change in average tenure length of native 
Texas/Florida households over the same time period.  DDD indicates the DD for 
migrant/immigrant households minus the DD for native-born households.  The sample 
consists of households living in metropolitan areas in California, Texas and Florida in 
1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000.  Figures are calculated using weights.        27 
Table 2:  Summary Statistics for Owner-Occupiers 
1970    1980    1990    2000 
Owners  CA  FL&TX  CA  FL&TX  CA  FL&TX  CA  FL&TX
  mean  mean  mean  Mean  mean  mean  mean 
Years in residence  10.76  10.65  11.13  10.35  12.64  11.89  13.43  11.65
   Income:   
Family total income ($)  13292  11053  27711  24108  57220  45625  83600  70479
Income from welfare ($)  30.94  13.33  74.45  49.79  113.39  88.09  28.19  21.14
  Race dummies: 
African-American  0.05  0.10  0.06  0.10  0.05  0.10  0.05 
Hispanic  0.11  0.10  0.11  0.11  0.14  0.14  0.18 
Asian  0.02  0.00  0.05  0.01  0.08  0.01  0.10 
Other races  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.03 
  Education dummies:             
High school  0.30  0.26  0.27  0.28  0.19  0.23  0.17 
Some college  0.18  0.13  0.24  0.19  0.32  0.27  0.32 
Bachelor  0.09  0.08  0.12  0.12  0.19  0.18  0.21 
Post graduate  0.10  0.07  0.16  0.11  0.14  0.11  0.15 
   Marital status dummies: 
Married  0.80  0.78  0.73  0.73  0.69  0.68  0.67 
Separated  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Divorced  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.09  0.11  0.11  0.12 
Widowed  0.10  0.13  0.10  0.13  0.11  0.14  0.10 
If children age <=6  0.21  0.20  0.16  0.16  0.17  0.15  0.16 
Number of children  1.41  1.31  1.08  1.00  0.94  0.84  0.97 
  Age dummies:               
Age 36-45  0.24  0.21  0.22  0.20  0.25  0.23  0.24 
Age 46-55  0.26  0.23  0.21  0.19  0.20  0.18  0.25 
Age 56-65  0.18  0.19  0.19  0.18  0.17  0.17  0.17 
Age 66 up  0.17  0.21  0.18  0.23  0.22  0.26  0.23 
  Migration status dummies: 
Born in state  0.24  0.40  0.28  0.38  0.31  0.32  0.34 
Migrant  0.63  0.51  0.57  0.52  0.49  0.53  0.39 
Immigrant & 0-10 years in US  n.a.  n.a.  0.03  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.02 
Immigrant & 11-20 years in US  n.a.  n.a.  0.04  0.03  0.06  0.04  0.08 
Immigrant & 21+ years in US  n.a.  n.a.  0.08  0.05  0.11  0.09  0.16 
Immigrant  0.13  0.09  0.15  0.10  0.20  0.15  0.27 
  Metropolitan area size: 
If large metropolitan area  0.78  0.58  0.76  0.60  0.73  0.56  0.72 
If small metropolitan area  0.22  0.42  0.24  0.40  0.27  0.44  0.28 
  Housing characteristics:                
Single family detached  0.93  0.94  0.87  0.85  0.85  0.84  0.82 
Single family attached  0.02  0.01  0.05  0.03  0.09  0.05  0.09 
Multi-family housing unit  0.05  0.06  0.08  0.12  0.06  0.10  0.06 
  Employment status: 
At work & self-employed  0.11  0.11  0.12  0.10  0.13  0.11  0.11 
At work & not self-employed  0.63  0.60  0.60  0.58  0.57  0.55  0.54 
Not at work & self-employed  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Not at work & not self-employed  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
At work & armed forces  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00 
Not at work & armed forces   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Unemployed  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Retired  0.13  0.17  0.14  0.19  0.18  0.22  0.19 
Not in labor force  0.20  0.25  0.24  0.29  0.27  0.31  0.32 
   2.30   1.20  1.85  1.27  1.74  2.03  1.79   28 
 Metropolitan area characteristics: 
Metropolitan area unemp rate                                                              
Metropolitan area growth rate  31.44  36.90  17.28  38.34  27.87  27.82  14.21  25.44
% increase in average property value, previous  10 years  94.36  99.77  270.12  213.71  105.20  32.56  27.36  43.85
% increase in average property value since 1970  0  0  270.12  213.71  659.26  309.36  871.33  495.11
 
No. of observation (unweighted)  29985  18490  189507  153145  210676  176442  238174  226495  29 
Table 2, continued 
1970    1980    1990    2000 
Renters  CA  FL&TX  CA  FL&TX  CA  FL&TX  CA  FL&TX
  mean  mean  mean  mean  mean  mean  mean 
Years in residence  4.30  4.09  4.49  3.96  4.67  3.54  5.25 
  Income: 
Family total income ($)  8125  7440  14666  13824  29217  24568  40910 
Income from welfare ($)  143.41  43.72  337.29  132.08  610.66  194.46  281.61 
  Race: 
African-American  0.10  0.19  0.11  0.18  0.10  0.19  0.10 
Hispanic  0.14  0.14  0.18  0.18  0.24  0.22  0.31 
Asian  0.03  0.00  0.05  0.01  0.08  0.02  0.11 
Other races  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.04 
  Education:             
High school  0.29  0.23  0.28  0.29  0.21  0.24  0.19 
Some college  0.17  0.12  0.22  0.19  0.30  0.27  0.29 
Bachelor  0.07  0.07  0.09  0.09  0.14  0.14  0.16 
Post graduate  0.08  0.06  0.10  0.08  0.07  0.07  0.09 
   Marital status: 
Married  0.48  0.56  0.38  0.42  0.41  0.39  0.41 
Separated  0.06  0.06  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.07  0.06 
Divorced  0.17  0.13  0.22  0.21  0.20  0.23  0.19 
Widowed  0.15  0.15  0.12  0.14  0.08  0.10  0.07 
If children age <=6  0.20  0.23  0.17  0.18  0.22  0.20  0.22 
Number of children  0.91  1.08  0.77  0.82  0.94  0.82  0.99 
  Age:               
Age 36-45  0.19  0.20  0.19  0.18  0.26  0.25  0.29 
Age 46-55  0.17  0.16  0.13  0.13  0.13  0.12  0.18 
Age 56-65  0.14  0.14  0.11  0.11  0.08  0.08  0.09 
Age 66 up  0.18  0.19  0.16  0.18  0.13  0.14  0.12 
  Migration status: 
Born in state  0.19  0.36  0.24  0.36  0.27  0.33  0.29 
Migrant  0.65  0.51  0.54  0.48  0.43  0.45  0.31 
Immigrant & 0-10 years in US  n.a.  n.a.  0.10  0.06  0.13  0.10  0.12 
Immigrant & 11-20 years in US  n.a.  n.a.  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.06  0.15 
Immigrant & 21+ years in US  n.a.  n.a.  0.06  0.05  0.07  0.07  0.13 
Immigrant  0.17  0.13  0.21  0.16  0.30  0.22  0.40 
  Metropolitan area size: 
If large metropolitan area  0.84  0.64  0.82  0.65  0.78  0.61  0.78 
If small metropolitan area  0.16  0.36  0.18  0.35  0.22  0.39  0.22 
  Housing characteristics:                
Single family detached  0.34  0.40  0.25  0.27  0.25  0.25  0.24 
Single family attached  0.04  0.03  0.06  0.05  0.08  0.06  0.07 
Multi-family housing unit  0.62  0.57  0.68  0.68  0.67  0.69  0.68 
  Employment status: 
At work & self-employed  0.05  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.07  0.06  0.07 
At work & not self-employed  0.58  0.62  0.59  0.62  0.62  0.65  0.57 
Not at work & self-employed  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Not at work & not self-employed  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01 
At work & armed forces  0.02  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01 
Not at work & armed forces   0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Unemployed  0.04  0.02  0.04  0.03  0.04  0.04  0.04 
Retired  0.15  0.16  0.14  0.16  0.11  0.12  0.10 
Not in labor force  0.28  0.26  0.27  0.27  0.24  0.22  0.30 
   Metropolitan area characteristics: 
Metropolitan area unemp rate  2.35  1.23  1.85  1.26  1.76  2.07  1.80   30 
Metropolitan area growth rate  25.96  36.16  14.35  36.87  25.18  27.14  12.51 
% increase in average property value, previous  10 years  94.39  100.28  270.04  217.71  107.93  30.79  27.88 
% increase in average property value since 1970  0  0  270.04  217.71  669.52  311.62  893.16  499.59
 
No. of observation (unweighted)  21635  9159.00  131579  71806.00  144912  90331  169507  106108
   31 
 
Table 3:  Results of the Treatment Effects Model With Controls 
 
OLS            Owner      Renter   
            Coef  Std.err    Coef  Std.err 
Family total income          -9.E-06  1.E-06    -1.E-06  4.E-07 
Income from welfare           0.00  0.00    -5.E-05  8.E-06 
  Race (compared to white):               
African-American          1.02  0.26    0.82  0.17 
Hispanic            0.34  0.17    0.33  0.06 
Asian            -0.44  0.23    -0.12  0.17 
Other races            -0.15  0.11    -0.10  0.06 
  Education (compared to high school dropouts):             
High school            -0.29  0.16    -0.16  0.06 
Some college          -1.06  0.18    -0.41  0.06 
Bachelor            -1.65  0.11    -0.64  0.06 
Post graduate          -1.69  0.13    -0.67  0.10 
  Marital status and children                 
Married            -0.87  0.21    -0.86  0.05 
Separated            -0.81  0.19    -1.29  0.08 
Divorced            -0.66  0.11    -0.81  0.06 
Widowed            1.75  0.14    -0.38  0.11 
If children age <=6          -1.45  0.12    -0.15  0.04 
Number of children          0.17  0.03    0.06  0.01 
  Age  (compared to age 26-35)               
Age 36-45            2.51  0.12    1.21  0.11 
Age 46-55            6.09  0.19    2.45  0.19 
Age 56-65            9.92  0.41    3.82  0.19 
Age 66 up            13.20  0.61    5.69  0.26 
  Migration status (compared to native born)           
If migrant from out-of-state        -1.49  0.21    -0.46  0.08 
If immigrant        -3.25  0.22    -0.73  0.06 
  Housing characteristics (compared to multi-family housing unit)         
Single family detached        4.68  0.38    1.25  0.09 
Single family attached          0.73  0.29    0.41  0.05 
   Employment status (compared to not in labor force):             
At work & self-employed        -0.14  0.30    0.06  0.07 
At work & not self-employed        -0.54  0.20    -0.10  0.03 
Unemployed            -0.79  0.15    -0.39  0.06 
Retired        0.59  0.17    0.27  0.12 
   Year dummies                   
Year = 1980          0.23  0.36    .013  0.20 
Year = 1990          2.39  0.25    0.79  0.19 
Year = 2000          2.60  0.22    1.12  0.15 
   Other variables and constant                 
Year=1980*CA           -0.13  0.14    .0003  0.14 
Year=1990*CA           0.32  0.34    0.39  0.22 
Year=2000*CA           1.04  0.27    0.79  0.20 
Metro pop growth rate, previous 10  yrs      -0.02  0.005    0.00  0.00 
Metro unemployment rate        -0.02  0.25    -0.21  0.13 
Metro housing value growth rate, previous 10 yrs     .003  .002    .003  .001 
Constant            2.18  0.61    1.92  0.27 
Metro dummies          yes      yes   
R-squared            .36      .16     32 
 
Table 4A:  Difference-in-Difference Results  
From the Regressions in Table 3  
  1970 to 1980, 
CA vs TX/FL   
(years) 
1970 to 1990, 
CA vs TX/FL   
(years) 
1970 to 2000, 
CA vs TX/FL   
(years) 
Owners:  -.14          
(.14) 
.32           
(.34) 
1.04**           
(.27) 
Renters:   .0003           
(.14) 
.39           
(.22) 
.79**            
(.20)   33 





  DD  DDD   DD  DDD   DD  DDD  
  1970 to 1980  1970 to 1990  1970 to 2000 
Owners:             
White  -.04 
(.18) 
  .37  
(.33) 





  0.25 
(.69) 
  1.33* 
(.66) 
  .79   
(.55) 
Hispanic    -0.14 
(.25) 
  .46 (.41)    -.30 (.40) 
Asian    1.59* 
(.70) 
  1.51** 
(.78) 
  1.86** 
(.75) 
Renters:             
White  -.18 
(.25) 
  0.06 
(.32) 





  .79  
(.78) 
  1.78** 
(.70) 
  1.70** 
(.68) 
Hispanic    .43  
(.48) 
  .54    
(.33) 
  .30   
(.26) 
Asian    -2.13*** 
(.19) 
  -2.90*** 
(.24) 
  -2.77*** 
(.21)   34 
 






DD  DDD   DD  DDD   DD  DDD  
  1970 to 1980  1970 to 1990  1970 to 2000 
Owners:     
       
Native-
born 
-.63    
(.39)    -.58    
(.34) 
  .34     
(.39) 
 
Migrants    .82     
(.60)    1.56**   
(.55) 
  1.51***   
(.45) 
Immigrants    -.04   
(1.76)    -.04  
(1.49) 
  -.59    
(1.39) 
Renters:             
Native-
born 
-.32    
(.21) 
  .17     
(.28) 
  .49**     
(.17) 
 
Migrants    .44**     
(.18) 
  .40**     
(.17) 
  .57***     
(.18) 
Immigrants   
.23     
(.79)    -.32    
(.73) 






    35 
Table 5: 
Average Proposition 13 Subsidies by Metropolitan Area, 1980-2000 
                                                    1980          1990         2000 
California metropolitan areas: 
Bakersfield  $643  $558  $110 
Fresno  769  658  457 
Los Angeles-Long Beach  1339  2221  1360 
Anaheim-Santa Ana-Garden Grove  1377  2135  1494 
Sacramento  938  1320  788 
Salinas-Sea Side-Monterey  1291  2090  2316 
San Diego  1387  1707  1364 
San Francisco-Oakland-Vallejo  1379  2873  3499 
San Jose  1485  2569  3237 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc  1416  2158  2270 
Riverside-San Bernadino  854  1113  456 
Stockton  723  1146  637 
Ventura-Oxnard-Simi Valley  1285  2177  1432 
       
       
Texas metropolitan areas: 
Austin    -252  -628 
Beaumont-Port Arthur-Orange    55  -180 
Corpus Christi    -139  -572 
Dallas-Fort Worth    -12  -567 
El Paso    -141  -631 
Houston-Brazoria    -235  -718 
San Antonio    -119  -566 
       
Florida metropolitan areas:  
Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood-Pompano 
Beach,    200  -192 
Jacksonville    308  264 
Miami-Hialeah    -102  -268 
Orlando    449  176 
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater    289  77 
West Palm Beach-Boca Raton-Delray 
Beach    294  -7 
 
Notes:  Subsidies are equal to .0125* market value – actual property taxes.  For 
comparison purposes, the same method is followed to construct subsidies for all 
metropolitan areas in Texas and Florida.  All figures are in 2000 dollars.   36 
Table 6A:  The Distribution of Property Tax Subsidies in 
California and Florida, Mean Values by Quartile 
 
  CA  FL 











-$8   $428  $102  $193 
Mean of 
quartile 2  
$331  $1,333  $645  $635 
Mean of 
quartile 3  




$1,483  $4,188  $4,237  $2,707 
Note:  Dollar figures are in 2000 dollars.  California subsidies equal .0125*property value 
– property taxes.  Florida subsidies equal .02*property value – property taxes.   
   37 
Table 6B:  Average Years of Tenure by Subsidy Quartile for Owner-occupiers  
  California  Florida 
  1980  1990  2000  2000 
Quartile 1  12.98   9.19   9.65   11.17  
Quartile 2  9.73   11.13   11.91   11.85  
Quartile 3  9.22   12.98   15.40   11.15  
Quartile 4  10.33   17.23   16.84   9.96  
Note:  Figures in parentheses are standard errors.    38 
Table 7A:   
Regression Results Explaining Tenure Length as a Function of 
the Property Tax Subsidy 
  OLS  
1970/90/00 
with FL   [1]            
IV   
1970/90/00 
with FL      
[2]           
OLS           
1970/2000           
w/o FL       
[3] 
IV           
1970/2000         
w/o FL        
[4] 
Subsidy  .00171***       
(.0000989) 








-9.08e-8***         
(1.14e-8) 






    Note:  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  The sample is homeowners in California, Texas and Florida in 1970, 1990 
and 2000 in columns [1] and [2].  In columns [3] and [4], all households in 1990 and 
Florida households in 2000 are excluded.  The explanatory variables are year dummies, 
metropolitan area dummies, and the same individual-level and metropolitan area-level 
controls as in table 5A.  The instruments are the predicted subsidy if all households have 
10 years of tenure and the predicted subsidy squared.  All regressions report robust 
standard errors clustered by year-state. 
 
Table 7B:  Predicted Change in Years of Tenure as the 
Property Tax Subsidy Increases        
 
Subsidy  [1]              [2]                                               [3]  [4] 
$110 (Bakersfield)  .19  .11  .19  .22 
$450 (Fresno)  .75  .77  .77  .86 
$1400 (LA/Orange Co.)  2.2  2.3  2.3  2.5 
$3500 (SF/San Jose)  4.0  3.0  4.6  5.0 
Note:  results are based on the regressions in table 7A.  